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ABSTRACT This study examines what has been overlooked by most studies of Islamist acti-
vism in the early years of the multi-party politics (1945–60) in Turkey. By examining the
formal and informal political institutions, power relations and practices, it reveals that the
early Islamists did not remain content with only socio-cultural activities. They effectively
and creatively engaged with and within the political field, enjoyed an impact disproportionate
to their actual numbers and power, and set the parameters for future Islamist activism. In so
doing, they reproduced the Republican orthodoxy while advancing their heterodox claims.
Islamist movements have played a critical role in Republican Turkey’s political life
since the passage to multi-party politics in 1945. Yet, little is known of the political
nature of Islamist mobilization during the early years of multi-party politics. Most
studies of Islamism in Turkey adopt a macro-sociological approach that takes the
emergence of an Islamist political party in the formal sphere of politics in 1970 as
the starting point of Islamist political engagement. When addressing the early
years of multi-party politics, this approach, although recognizing the emergence of
certain Islamist groups and publications, does not consider their political activism
and tends to focus on merely Islamic “cultural activities,” explaining them as a
natural outcome of the relative loosening of the state’s grip on religion.1
This study delves into Islamist activism between 1945 and 1960 to bring the pol-
itical into analyses of this time period. Drawing from social movement theories and
Bourdieu’s Theory of Practice, it examines formal and informal political institutions,
power relations, and the practices of political actors. In so doing, this piece unravels
the enabling and constraining factors around Islamist activists’ emergence, resource
mobilization, and engagement with other political actors that allowed (or disallowed)
them to impact the political arena and the state.
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In what follows, this essay argues that after the passage to a multi-party regime, the
early Islamists did not satisfy themselves with socio-cultural activities. They effec-
tively engaged with and within the political field, mobilizing through and around
various publications and the two right-wing political parties, namely the mainstream
Democrat Party (DP, Demokrat Parti) and its conservative-nationalist offspring, the
Nation Party (NP, Millet Partisi). Second, this study demonstrates that the Islamists
sustained their mobilization from 1945 to 1953 by delicately balancing the ideational
and practical aspects of their engagement between political orthodoxy and hetero-
doxy, and between cooperation and contestation. In their conflicts with power
holders and the regime, they not only appropriated and reinterpreted the Republican
doxa,2 but also made effective use of the formal institutions. This pattern of political
engagement enabled them to have a disproportionate influence on the distribution of
state-controlled material and symbolic resources, and set the parameters for future
mobilizations.
This contribution develops its argument in four steps. The first section discusses
the early Islamist mobilization within the framework of existing opportunities and
constraints. This is followed by an analysis of Islamist demobilization from 1953
onwards. In the third section, the ideational and practical elements of the Islamist acti-
vism in relation to the political context are revealed. The final section briefly recapi-
tulates the main arguments of the essay and provides an overview of the outcomes of
Islamist mobilization. The research is primarily based on a review of the three major
nationally distributed Islamist publications of the period (1945–60), the minutes of
the Turkish Grand National Assembly (GNA, 1945–60) and DP Parliamentary
Group meetings (1950–60), which were mostly closed to the public from 1953
onwards. These written resources are used in conjunction with the data derived
from 30 in-depth interviews with various Islamist and non-Islamist actors of the
period at the central (Ankara and İstanbul) and peripheral levels (Kayseri, Maraş,
and Konya) of the political arena.3
The Changing Political Opportunity Structures and Early Islamist
Mobilization
In the wake of the Second World War, the ruling Kemalist elites organized in the
Republican People’s Party (RPP, Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi), introduced a competitive
multi-party regime. This regime inevitably resulted in the loosening of state control
over religious life4 and the polity, thus changing the political opportunity structure,
which refers to relatively durable formal and informal institutions and their percep-
tion by political actors as creating incentives for collective action.5 The former
resulted in the (re)emergence of religious groups and networks that formed a potential
pool of constituents and activists for Islamist mobilization;6 the latter provided the
Islamist elites with formal and informal platforms to engage with and within the pol-
itical field. Locally, Qur’anic courses proliferated, mosque attendance increased,
otherwise illegal traditional brotherhoods (for instance, Nakşibendis and Kadiris)
thrived and new religious movements such as the Risale-i Nur Students (RNS)7






























and the Süleymancıs8 saw the daylight. Local networks shaped around the scholars of
the officially prohibited traditional religious schools, medreses, and newly estab-
lished associations for building and developing Prayer Leader and Preacher (PLP,
İmam Hatip) schools or mosques have also provided the potential participants of
the Islamist mobilization.
Several formal and informal constraints prevented Islamist activism from forming
a durable political party organization.9 Nevertheless, there was significant Islamist
engagement in politics through other opportunity structures after 1946. The informal
liberalization of the polity and then its partial institutionalization through new laws by
1950 relatively freed the press, associational life, and the political field. Sub-
sequently, Islamist actors were able to publish magazines and newspapers, participate
in the activities of such right-wing socio-political associations as the Nationalists’
Association of Turkey (NAT, Türkiye Milliyetçiler Derneği), join the DP (the main-
stream right-wing party), and finally, forge alliances with conservative-nationalists to
establish political parties, among them the relatively successful NP.10 Through these
mediums Islamists were able to communicate and establish long-lasting relations
with each other and recruit a new generation of Islamists on the one hand, and on
the other, to spar and cooperate with the power holders to initiate policy change.
Islamist Magazines
While it is not possible to establish the exact number of Islamist periodicals published
from 1945 to 1960,11 it is not difficult to name the most popular and influential ones.
Sebilürreşad, Büyük Doğu, and Serdengeçti, and their respective editors/owners,
Eşref Edip (Fergan), Necip Fazıl (Kısakürek), and Osman Yüksel (Serdengeçti)12
are still revered in Islamist circles as the pioneers of Islamist activism. These maga-
zines supported Islamist activities within the right-wing political parties and associ-
ations and contributed to the countrywide dissemination of Islamist mobilization
frames and identity from the late 1940s onwards. They owed their impacts at the
national and local levels of politics to the fact that:
(1) They could be read for free in about 80 local branches of the NAT throughout the
country.13
(2) Their editorials were reprinted time and again in various local Islamist and con-
servative-nationalist publications such as Ehli Sünnet, İslam Yolu, İslamın Nuru,
Fetih, and Hakka Doğru.14
(3) Their editors and writers frequently visited Anatolian towns for conferences and
seminars (usually organized by the NAT)15 and established long-term relations
with the local religious networks.
Originally Sırat-ı Müstakim (1908–09), Sebilürreşad was the most prominent Isla-
mist magazine of the Second Constitutional period of the Ottoman Empire (1908–
18). During the War of Independence (1919–22), it had supported the Kemalist
leadership until they established the secular Republic in 1923. Sebilürreşad was






























shut down, along with all other opponent and/or autonomous bodies following the
Kurdish/religious Sheikh Said Rebellion in 1925. Its editor, Eşref Edip, was
accused of encouraging and supporting the rebellion and was tried in the extraordi-
nary Independence Tribunals, set up temporarily to punish the alleged rebels and
their abettors. He managed to avoid capital punishment and went underground,
like other Islamists, only to reintroduce Sebilürreşad in 1948 and publish it regularly
until 1966. Büyük Doğu and Serdengeçti first appeared in 1943 and 1947, respect-
ively. They were published irregularly because their relatively young editors, Serden-
geçti and Necip Fazıl, did not learn how to sidestep the laws and were frequently
prosecuted. Although Büyük Doğu was closed down 13 times until its final issue
in 1978,16 it managed to form a dense Islamist network, thanks particularly to
Necip Fazıl’s charismatic persona and frequent conferences in Anatolia.17 Further-
more, since Serdengeçti sent reprints to provincial booksellers, newspapers stands,
and subscribers, this magazine’s influence and circulation in Anatolia were more
than what its mere 33 issues (published between 1947 and 1960) may suggest.
These three major Islamist periodicals became the hubs of Islamist political
engagement and facilitated the formation and mobilization of an Islamist network
in Turkey. Their uninhibited opposition to the practices of the single-party era
induced Islamist elites from different milieus and communities, including Bediüz-
zaman Said Nursi, the leader of the RNS, to publish their writings in and support
these magazines. There were attempts to unite the newly consolidating local Isla-
mist networks into a formal organization. In 1949, Necip Fazıl, together with
such prominent Islamist columnists and commentators as Cevat Rıfat Atılhan (Sebi-
lürreşad), Abdürrahim Zapsu (Ehli Sünnet), Haluk Nurbaki (İslamın Nuru), and
Şükrü Çelikalay (a hero of the War of Independence and an Islamist deputy who
had opposed the abolition of the Caliphate in 1924) established the Great East
Association (GEA, Büyük Doğu Cemiyeti), which dissolved in May 1951
because of financial difficulties.18 The second attempt came in August 1951 in
the form of the Islam Democrat Party (IDP, İslam Demokrat Partisi) under the lea-
dership of Atılhan. The IDP was banned in November 1952 on the grounds that its
program contravened laws prohibiting the use of religious elements in association
names and programs.
At the micro level, the cases of the GEA, Atılhan and the IDP, demonstrate how
Islamist activists operating within smaller right-wing political parties and associ-
ations and the grassroots networks that were formed around Islamist publications
were interconnected. In addition to writing regularly for Sebilürreşad, Atılhan con-
tributed to Büyük Doğu and such smaller publications as Hür Adam (İstanbul) and
Büyük Cihad (Samsun).19 He was a founder of two of the short-lived right-wing
parties20 as well as the GEA. The IDP itself relied on the previous networks of
the GEA, the two largest right-wing associations of the period (the NAT and the
Association for Spreading Knowledge, İlim Yayma Cemiyeti), and the groups that
had formed around the local periodicals such as Hür Adam, Büyük Cihad, Yeşil
Bursa (Bursa) and Büyük Dava (İzmir), all of which “acted like party
publications.”21






























The Right-Wing Political Parties
Unable to function as a political party, Islamists engaged in formal politics primarily
through the DP and the strongest of the smaller right-wing parties, the NP. The DP
and the NP were coalitions of various political forces, including liberals, conserva-
tive-nationalists, ultranationalists, and Islamists. The DP, established and controlled
by former RPP elites, defined itself primarily in anti-tutelary terms and attracted
divergent social and economic interests and political forces united in their opposition
to the authoritarian RPP. The NP, on the other hand, was established in 1948 by pro-
minent conservative-nationalist figures from the DP,22 who, accusing DP elites of
being too loyal an opposition, wanted a clearer break from the RPP’s stringent
secularism.
While many Islamists joined the DP and the NP at the local and national levels,23
Islamist publications remained non-committal, even aloof,24 until the DP’s electoral
victory in 1950. As the quashing of the two previous attempts at a multi-party regime
was on the grounds of increased “reactionaryism,”25 the Islamist magazines probably
feared that their explicit support of the DP before the election could provide a pretext
to suppress the new attempt as well. From 1950 to the coup d’état of 1960, however,
the Islamists allied with and supported the DP, but without entirely abandoning the
NP. There seems to be three interrelated factors that motivated Islamists to work
and vote for the DP instead of the NP. First, for Islamists, the elections acted as a “ple-
biscite” on the RPP and its secular reforms;26 dividing the vote between the DP and
the NP under the majoritarian electoral system of the time would play into the hands
of the RPP. Thus, even Islamist NP members were inclined to vote for the DP.27 In
fact, Islamists within the NP tried to transform their party into a pressure group that
would influence decision-making processes without endangering the DP’s incum-
bency. As the following quote from Sebilürreşad illustrates, Islamist magazines sup-
ported this stance:
Yes, the Nation Party should criticize the mistakes of the Democrats. In so
doing, however, one should not help the Republicans inadvertently, since the
Nation Party did not attain the power to prevent the Republicans from plaguing
the nation, should the Democrats be toppled. Consequently, it is in the best
interest of the nation that the leaders of the Nation Party confront the Repub-
licans rather than the Democrats.28
Second, the Islamists needed to tap into state-controlled material and symbolic
resources to sustain their mobilization and increase their political capital as a group
and as individuals. The DP government, with its liberal attitude toward religion
and its eagerness to establish its patronage over Islamists and the religious networks,
would indeed help them to overcome, though incrementally and precariously, the
strains that their limited organizational, financial, and symbolic capital created.
Third, the formal constraints effectively rendered any collective activity relying on
religious signs and symbols subject to criminal charges. The survival of formal






























and informal Islamist institutions therefore depended on the tolerance and goodwill of
the government, constructing a vicious circle that compelled Islamist activists to seek
the protective patronage of the DP, but rendered them hostages to its will.
For Islamists, the early (1950) measures of the DP in the religious domain were
relatively satisfactory. Removing the clause from Article 526 of the Penal Code pro-
hibiting the use of any language other than Turkish in reciting ezan (the call to prayer)
and then broadcasting Qur’an recitations on the state radio had won their hearts. The
Islamist magazines recognized that although the DP was incapable of initiating “a
fundamental reform” that would reflect the “values of the people,”29 they enthusias-
tically applauded its accomplishments and declared the new DP-dominated GNA as
“the complete and free manifestation of the national will,” thus legitimate.30 The atti-
tudes and speeches of Islamist DP deputies were also complimentary. For instance,
Ömer Bilen declared the end of the “oligarchy” and thanked God for being able to
talk about “our religion, religiosity, God and the Prophet with no hesitation under
this . . . roof.”31
Being able to talk about religion helped Islamists form alliances with conservative-
nationalist DP members and deploy the NP as leverage in pressurizing the DP gov-
ernment to increase the state’s material and symbolic investment in the religious
domain. The debate over the status of the Presidency of Religious Affairs (PRA) is
revelatory. The NP, in an attempt to attract religious and Islamist constituents into
its ranks, argued for the establishment of an independent PRA, which would
control the vast resources of the nationalized Pious Foundations and thus rescue it
from dependence on the DP’s patronage.32 However, the NP miscalculated Islamist
and DP reactions. Islamists sympathized with the idea of an autonomous PRA only to
the extent that it would serve to pressure the DP government to alter the nature and
direction of the Kemalist control of religion, which aimed at reducing religion’s role
in public and societal affairs. In other words, Islamists were not against state control
of religion itself, but of its nature under RPP rule. As early as 1949, Eşref Edip of
Sebilürreşad had maintained that as long as the state “works for the development
and growth of the religion [Islam] . . .” the government could continue claiming
that it was secular free from “disgrace.”33 Consequently, in order to realize their
aim, Islamists not only tried to curb the power of conservative-nationalist leaders
within the NP, but also continued to cooperate with the DP as long as it supported
and developed existing religious institutions and increased religion’s role in public
affairs.34
As the minutes of a June 1953 DP Parliamentary Group meeting show, the DP
elites were worried about the NP’s intention to capture “the flag of religion” by pro-
pagating the PRA’s autonomy.35 It is thus not surprising that only a few months later,
in January 1954, the DP shut down the NP for encouraging “reactionary” activity.36
The opportunity was provided by the resignation of prominent conservative-nation-
alist leaders from the NP in July 1953 in reaction to the NP General Congress’ June
refusal to ratify the decision expelling famous Islamist M. Raif Ogan from the party.
The resignations in the face of what seemed to be an Islamist takeover were viewed
by the DP as an official denunciation, paving the way for the party’s closure.37 This






























was not only a move to protect the secularist image of the DP in the eyes of the Kem-
alist establishment; it was also aimed at punishing the Islamists (for reasons discussed
below) and their conservative-nationalist political rivals: the DP elites did not want to
lose their clients to the NP.38
The Islamist Demobilization
The assassination attempt on November 22, 1952, in Malatya of Ahmet Emin Yalman,
editor of the daily Vatan, gave the DP government an opportunity to show its secularist
credentials, to fend off charges of tolerating and even encouraging “reactionary” activi-
ties and to curb the Islamists’ growing autonomy. The government began cracking
down on Islamists by declaring the assassination attempt part of a larger plot by the
GEA and the IDP targeting famous secularist editors of Cumhuriyet, Dünya, and
Ulus.39 Consequently, Necip Fazıl was charged and convicted with involvement in
the “conspiracy” and his magazine was closed down, Serdengeçti40 and the RNS
were regularly harassed by security forces, and the NAT was closed in 1953 (followed
by the above-discussed closure of the NP).41 Moreover, five of the DP’s Islamist depu-
ties were expelled.42 Prime Minister Adnan Menderes defended this action, asserting,
“the DP is not a hotel. We will not allow . . . those outsiders [with their distinct] ideas,
convictions, and organizations . . . to exploit us.”43 Henceforth, the Islamist movement
was demobilized until the second half of the 1950s. When Islamists resumed their
activities, including within the GNA,44 they did so with less intensity and avoided con-
frontation because of the DP’s increasingly authoritarian policies and tendency to
repress anyone who dared to criticize the government.45
Islamist Engagement between Political Orthodoxy and Heterodoxy
Ideational Aspects
Islamist movements, similar to other social movements, initiate and sustain mobiliz-
ation mostly through ideational elements, which fulfill the important task of provid-
ing movement activists with interpretive schemata (collective action and identity
frames) to render their actions and experiences meaningful, to draw symbolic bound-
aries between us and them, and to aggregate their resources to achieve shared goals.46
Rather than being preconceived or pre-political resources, ideational elements are
products of an interactive process within the political field. As such, they are inevi-
tably political in the sense of being politically dependent and politically aspiring.
The Theory of Practice, which investigates the dynamics in such sociological fields
as the political arena, science and literature, aids in recognizing the inseparability of
ideational elements from power relations. Ideational products are not solely an
outcome of the creativity of rational agents. As communication tools, they are part
and parcel of power relations, thus intertwined with the doxa of a specific field.
They depend on “the [thus far] accumulated material and symbolic power of the indi-
viduals (or institutions)”47 within the field of action, on the one hand, and they serve






























to increase this power on the other. It is through the accumulation of symbolic power,
that is increasing the value of a specific symbolic capital that is related to one’s status
within a field, that one builds up material (economic and social) capital and even
achieves a monopoly on ideational production482hence the politically dependent
and aspiring nature of action frames and identity.
It could therefore be suggested that Islamist actors tried to increase the value of a
symbolic capital that was already available in the political arena and with which they
associated themselves: religion. Their ideational production aimed at augmenting the
value of things associated with Islam, or reshuffling the symbolic order of things in
“Muslims”’ favor. Such heterodoxy, however, also entailed a hidden orthodoxy:
appropriating the entire doxa of the political field, whose “recognition is implicated
by membership in the field itself.”49 In other words, Islamists, like dominant members
of the political field who defended the existing hierarchy of doxic elements, adopted
the stakes of the game and tacitly “agree[d] on the objects of dissensus,” as these were
“constitutive of the field itself.”50
An alla Turca definition and practice of secularism, which involves neither separ-
ation of religion from state, nor indifference of state towards religion, was institutio-
nalized in the early years of the Republic, thanks to the consolidation of the Kemalist
power structure. The institutionalization of secularism meant that secularism pro-
vided the foremost element of the doxa of the political field, alongside Turkish
nationalism. The nature of secularism as a doxic element was determined by an idea-
tional framework with regard to the role of religion and the practical task of construct-
ing a nation-state over the remnants of a multi-ethnic, multi-confessional, and multi-
cultural empire, where the primary loyalties were to religious communities, tribes,
and brotherhoods. The former, having taken the West as its muse and seen an inherent
“incompatibility” between Islamic and Western societies, sought to eliminate Islamic
values, laws, and customs for a modernization process along Western lines.51 The
task of constructing a nation-state, however, compelled the Republican elites to
accept Islam as a resource for “imagining” the Turkish nation, since the religious
geography of Anatolia and Thrace had become quite homogenously Muslim,
especially after the deportation and massacre of the Armenians in late Ottoman
Empire and the exchange of populations with Greece in early Republic. Yet, using
religion to build national identity would not only contradict the Kemalist frames
and vision of the nation based on science and knowledge, but could also
(1) Reinforce communitarian loyalties and thus diminish the loyalty for the nation-
state.
(2) Encourage extraterritorial ambitions seeking to unite Muslim countries.
(3) Become an ideational resource for Kurdish nationalist mobilization around the
brotherhoods.
(4) Substitute the nation as the principal reference of politics and identity.52
The Kemalist elites tried to resolve this problem through a definition and practice of
secularism that submitted religion to the service and control of the state. This project






























aimed at shaping “a rational and national Islam, charged with the political task of
legitimizing [Kemalist] power, supporting its will to eradicate all non-official
[forms of] religiosity (brotherhood, Ottoman, Arabic, popular) in the name of pro-
gress, revolution and civilization,”53 relegating religion as a private affair.54 Secular-
ism was thus elevated “to a constitutional obligation, conditioning even the
citizenship,”55 which, in turn, meant, at least within the political arena, “religion
and the religious could exist only in a submitted condition” and the nation, whose
Muslimness had been admitted, could exist only if “secular.”56
It was thus not a coincidence that notwithstanding its “submitted” and “domesti-
cated” status, Islam had paradoxically become, alongside Turkishness, secularism,
and progress/modernization, a doxic element. Since the doxa was ultimately tied to
“the question of exercising power in the name of the nation,”57 the component of
Islam, even if subservient, offered an alternative disposition of power for Islamists.
Hence, after the transition to competitive politics, Islam and secularism became the
most-disputed subjects of the political arena.
Islamists were heterodox players to the extent that they defined the nation primarily
as (Sunni) Muslim and claimed to represent its political will.58 Specifically, they
offered an alternative version of the founding moment of the Turkish nation-state
and questioned the legitimacy of the Republican elites and their reforms. The
RPP’s single-party regime and secularizing reforms were legitimized on the basis
of the claim that the RPP was the organization of the nationalist elite and the War
of Independence heroes Atatürk and his successor İnönü. After the transition to the
multi-party regime, however, taking their clues from such Islamist figures as Eşref
Edip or DP parliamentarian Gazi Yiğitbaşı (who themselves fought in the War of
Independence), Islamists argued that the nation had engaged in the War with a
spirit founded on “religion and faith”59 and had not envisioned the secular regime
established by the RPP.60 Hence, they declared the RPP a usurper and its secular
reforms illegitimate. Moreover, they claimed that since throughout the single-party
period the RPP was unaccountable for its actions, its reforms could not categorically
reflect the will of the nation.61 Islamists furthered their argument by offering an
alternative vision of progress and decline that refuted the Republican blame of
Islam for the backwardness of the nation: the “backwardness” was due to the Wester-
nization policies that had been in place since the nineteenth century, which resulted in
loss of identity and authenticity as well as in the moral decay of Muslim society. Isla-
mists maintained that Muslims progressed only when they exclusively adopted the
principles of Islam.62
Hence, Islamists could not escape from reproducing the national will discourse,
despite their efforts to differentiate themselves from the power holders. In fact, it
was the reproduction of this orthodoxy that gave them the opportunity to introduce
their limited heterodoxy. The acceptance of the nation-state boundaries that were
formed following the War of Independence; the juxtaposition of Muslimness primar-
ily with the nation that remained within these borders; the rejection of the objective
and observable condition of the nation as a political collectivity composed of diverse
citizens and socio-economic, ethnic, cultural, and interest groups; and finally, the call






























for moral development, would become staples of the Islamist movements in Turkey
in the years to come.
The association of the nation with Muslimness helped the early Islamists and their
future generations to express their particularistic material and moral interests and to
associate them with the “best interest” of the nation. The reproduction of orthodoxy,
to the extent that Islam was its constitutive element, consolidated Islamists as legit-
imate players in the political game, forced the other actors to play along, and
hence amplified Islamists’ demands and influence. The appropriation and reinterpre-
tation of the Islamic element of the doxa forced all political actors to think and
comment on religious issues: because the mainstream right-wing parties had
already put Islam into use to increase their democratic credibility in the eyes of the
electorate and the RPP had established itself as a guardian of the secular system,
they needed to introduce and reintroduce versions of Muslimness attributed to the
nation to face the Islamist challenge.
Consequently, from a perspective focusing on relations of power and parallel
opportunity structures, the goal of Turkish Islamists in the political field did not
appear to be one of changing state and society as such but one of transfiguring the
hierarchy of symbolic values associated with Islam to increase their political, econ-
omic, and social capital and those of the movement. There is no need, then, to attri-
bute hidden plans, or ill-formulated ideologies to the actors to explain the discrepancy
between their frames of Islamization of state and society and their careful and consen-
sual relations with the elites. To be sure, capturing the state apparatus would be the
ultimate solution, as it would reseal the game in Islamist terms, placing Islam and thus
its guardians, in the highest echelon. However, as shall be seen, the symbolic and
material gains achieved through political engagement satisfied the actors in a multi-
plicity of ways, such that the ultimate solution, either implicit or explicit in their sym-
bolic production, came to serve as a symbolic challenge to the rivals rather than a full-
fledged social engineering venture.
Practical Aspects
Islamists realized that a democratic regime entailed both opportunities and constraints
for its players. They praised democracy as a blessing,63 because unlike the single-
party regime, it allowed Islamists to exist and created the possibility of institutional
change. However, perceiving themselves as the representatives of the truth of God,
Islamists also considered the plurality of truths in democracy as inherently offensive
to Islam. They felt compelled to put up with democratic plurality only because the
other option would be submitting to the authoritarian RPP’s truth.64
Accordingly, Islamist demands and actions were twofold. First, they sought the
reversal of secular reforms, asking for the abolishment of women’s rights, the sover-
eignty of Islamic laws, i.e. the Sharia regime,65 and the reintroduction of the consti-
tutional clause declaring Islam as the religion of the state.66 There were also symbolic
radical demands ranging from the closure of Freemason associations67 to the reopen-
ing of Ayasofya (St. Sophia) Museum to daily prayers.68 Second, these contentious






























demands were almost always accompanied by milder ones aiming at changing the
scope and nature of state involvement with religion. Such requests included increases
in the budget and personnel of the PRA, pay raises for PRA employees, establishing
more PLP schools, introducing religious classes in junior high and high schools,
opening Qur’an and Arabic courses, and establishing scholarships for students of
the Faculty of Theology at Ankara University. The conservative-nationalist deputies
within the DP always supported these milder demands.69
As noted above, the radical claims were made in the name of the Muslim nation
and complemented the above-discussed ideational products. As such, in challenging
the authority of the power holders, Islamists also reproduced the doxa of the political
field. The milder demands, in turn, reflected the double nature of Islamist ideational
production: they aimed at increasing state investment in the religious domain, and
thereby their social, symbolic, and economic capital. They were, as DP deputy Ali
Fahri İşeri pointed out, seeds they sowed in the public space.70 In return for the gov-
ernment granting the mild demands, Islamists agreed to forego the radical demands.
In the budgetary discussions of 1952, İşeri argued that one should be able to inquire
into the possibility of reintroducing polygamy into the Civil Law. Met with strong
negative reaction, he replied that in democracies people are considered mature
(reşit) enough to express their views freely, and since the Turkish nation had
proved its maturity, people should be free to discuss any subject without being
labeled as a reactionary. He felt that mere discussion of such things was not
harmful; it would not necessarily and immediately result in legislation. After legiti-
mizing his demand, which targeted one of the pillars of secular reforms, İşeri immedi-
ately turned to his practical and moderate concern: airing religious speeches on the
state radio station at least two or three times a week. Deputy Prime Minister Samet
Ağaoğlu’s response highlighted the DP leadership’s attitude toward such challenges
and the possibility of compromise. He declared that the government would take into
consideration only those statements congruent with the DP program; other statements
should not be taken seriously. He then added, amidst much applause and joy, that the
government was willing to allocate an additional 480,000TL to be shared between the
PRA and the employees of provincial mosques.71
Conclusion
The introduction of a multi-party regime and the ensuing liberalization in the political
and religious domain resulted in the first wave of Islamist mobilization in Republican
Turkey. Despite formal constraints and the lack of a political organization of exclu-
sively their own, Islamists created networks and engaged with power holders through
publications, associations, and the right-wing political parties represented in the
GNA. The balance between orthodoxy and heterodoxy that the political context
imposed, and that Islamists skillfully (re)produced, enabled Islamist magazines and
political elites to influence the polity: not only did religious rhetoric, signs, and
symbols gain unprecedented value, but state investment in the religious domain stea-
dily increased throughout the period and in the following years.72






























The Islamists achieved the following major short-term impacts: PLP courses that
had been established by the RPP in 1949 were transformed into specialized three-
year junior high schools in 1951, with nineteen PLP schools opened by 1959.73 An
Institute of Islam was established in 1959 to further train the PLP graduates. More-
over, religious education in primary schools was elevated to a quasi-compulsory
status in 1951 by introducing the opt-out system, in which parents who wanted
their children exempt from these courses had to submit a written request.74 In
1956, the religious classes were expanded to junior high schools. The funds allo-
cated to state-controlled religious institutions steadily increased until the Inter-
national Monetary Fund imposed austerity measures in 1959. This guaranteed
maintenance of and personnel in mosques, whose construction was mostly financed
by private individuals and associations established for this purpose. The increases
in PRA cadres and budget extended its influence and presence in the country and
created job opportunities for Islamists in local religious networks.75 Increases in
the PRA’s budget were also intended to elevate the standards of living of religious
personnel and render a career in the PRA more attractive, thereby increasing enrol-
ment in PLP schools.
Regarding long-term impacts, Islamists successfully introduced strong religious
themes in the political field and managed to normalize a policy of public spending
in (Sunni) religious affairs, which created a potential pool for future Islamist recruit-
ment. By 1965, as the polity re-liberalized, the elites of the Islamist generation that
had been formed in the 1950s were working toward the establishment of the National
Order Party, the first in a series of NOM parties that have become a consistent feature
of politics in Turkey. Necip Fazıl, Eşref Edip, and Süleyman Arif Emre, one of the
lawyers of the NP in the party closure case, were influential actors in the party’s estab-
lishment in 1970.
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nationalist leader). Karpat, Turkey’s Politics, 432.
23. For the DP congresses, see Duman, Demokrasi Sürecinde Türkiye’de İslamcılık, 41, and Cahiers de
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1953), 1; and (February 3, 1953), 1.
43. Cited in Ahmad and Ahmad (1977), 106.
44. The Islamist deputies from Isparta were readmitted shortly before 1954 elections.
45. For the DP government’s measures to silence the press, universities, unions and opposition in general
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Cahiers de L’Orient Contemporain, no. 23 (1951): 114.
Cahiers de L’Orient Contemporain, no. 26 (1952): 206.
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DP Meclis Grubu Müzakere Zabıtı, (December 16, 1952).
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1949).
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